

# Sprout Social Investment Report

Sprout Social sells software that helps brands manage their social media: publishing, engagement, customer care, listening, and analytics, now with a proprietary AI agent called Trellis. The business is close to breakeven on a GAAP basis, generates real free cash flow, and sits on net cash. The stock trades near 1x sales because growth has cooled to about 11% and the market does not yet trust the AI story. This report tests whether the numbers support a re-rating.

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## 68

score out of 100

### **Verdict: Selective Positive. Near-breakeven SaaS at 1x sales, with the SBC wart shrinking.**

Revenue grows about 11%, free cash flow is positive and rising, and the balance sheet holds about \$87M of net cash. Stock-based compensation, the historic wart, is falling both in dollars and as a share of revenue. The open questions are growth durability and whether AI widens or narrows the moat.

**Reference share price: \$10.38 (October 1, 2026 close). Market cap about \$570 million.**

This is independent research, not investment advice. Every claim in this report is sourced. All data is dated. Anything after October 1, 2026 is not included.

# How to read this report

**\$10.38**

Reference price: October 1, 2026 close (+6.2% on the day).  
52-week range: \$4.92 to \$14.29.

**\$23.00**

Base-case FY2029 price target. Scenario, not a forecast. See page 9.

**\$481.8M**

Trailing-twelve-month revenue through Q2 2026, up 11.8% year over year.

**\$87.4M**

Net cash: \$119.9M cash against \$32.5M drawn on the credit facility, June 30, 2026.

## Five things that decide the outcome

| QUESTION                             | WHAT TO WATCH                                                                                                       |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Is the SBC wart really shrinking? | Yes, so far: 12.8% of revenue in Q2 2026, down from 20.8% in 2024. The trend must continue.                         |
| 2. Can growth hold near 11%?         | The enterprise \$30k+ cohort grows 20% and is 61% of subscription revenue. The SMB tail is the drag.                |
| 3. Does AI help or hurt?             | Trellis is now a paid upsell (\$35/user/month) with early retention evidence. Native platform tools are the threat. |
| 4. Is the balance sheet safe?        | Net cash, positive free cash flow, \$67.5M undrawn on the facility. Yes, with a lawsuit caveat.                     |
| 5. What is \$10.38 paying for?       | About 1.2x trailing sales and 1.0x enterprise value to sales. A SaaS multiple for a SaaS business, barely.          |

**Plain-language promise.** Jargon is explained the first time it appears. Sentences stay short. Every number carries a source.

# The business engine: social intelligence, sold as software


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Sprout Social sells a cloud platform that lets brands run their social media from one place. **Social intelligence** is the company's term for turning the flood of public social conversation into decisions: what customers are saying, what competitors are doing, what might become a crisis. The suite covers publishing and scheduling, a unified Smart Inbox for engagement, social customer care, influencer marketing (Tagger), advocacy, and listening and analytics.

The model is classic **SaaS** (software as a service): customers pay a subscription, usually annual or multi-year, and revenue is recognized evenly over the contract. Subscription revenue is 99% of the total. Gross margin sits near 78%, which is healthy software economics. The company serves more than 30,000 brands, and about 26% of revenue comes from outside the US.

Two acquisitions shaped the current platform: Tagger Media (influencer marketing) and NewsWhip (predictive media intelligence, which added predictive scoring for communities like Reddit). CEO Ryan Barretto says the platform ingests more than 2 billion real-time social interactions daily through hundreds of APIs, and calls that data scale "a strong competitive moat."

Revenue keeps growing, but the growth rate keeps cooling



Twelve quarters of revenue: steady growth, but the year-over-year rate has cooled from 41% to under 11%. 2023-2024 quarters per MacroTrends; 2025-2026 per company releases and SEC filings.

# Trellis AI and the enterprise mix shift

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**Trellis** is Sprout's proprietary AI agent. Instead of clicking through dashboards, a user asks a plain-language question and Trellis answers from billions of social data points: executive-ready summaries, risk detection, launch monitoring, sentiment themes routed to product and care teams. It was unveiled in May 2026, rolled out across Publishing, Listening, Smart Inbox, and Reporting, and has been available to every customer on every plan since July 2026. **Trellis Studio** lets teams build custom AI workflow templates.

The pricing is where it gets interesting for investors. Every user gets 100 Trellis credits a month inside the base plan. **Trellis Plus**, launched in July 2026 for heavier usage, costs \$35 per user per month on monthly billing or \$28 on annual billing, for 1,000 credits. This is a genuine ARPU (average revenue per user) lever: AI usage that scales with value, priced per seat.

**Early evidence it is working.** On the Q2 call, Barretto said customers using Trellis "retained at a higher rate than customers without active Trellis users." JetBlue and Ipsy are public case studies: reporting and launch-monitoring work cut from hours to minutes. Monthly active usage is growing, and a Fortune 50 financial services company expanded \$893,000 in Q2 to add Service Cloud integration and Guardian compliance monitoring.

The enterprise mix shift is the other engine. Customers contributing \$30,000 or more in ARR (annualized recurring revenue) grew to 3,926 in Q2 2026, up 11% year over year, and their approximated trailing-twelve-month subscription contribution grew 20% to \$291.7M, now 61.4% of subscription revenue, up from 53.1% two years earlier. Nearly half of new business is now multi-year contracts, up from one-third two years ago. The \$50,000+ cohort grew 16% to 2,127 customers.

# The SBC wart: shrinking, measurably

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**Stock-based compensation (SBC)** is pay in shares instead of cash. It is a real cost to shareholders because new shares dilute existing ones, but it does not consume cash. For years it was Sprout's ugliest line: \$84.3M in 2024, or 20.8 cents of every revenue dollar, the main reason GAAP earnings stayed negative while cash flow looked fine.

**The SBC wart is shrinking: down both in dollars and as a share of revenue**



SBC is falling in absolute dollars and as a share of revenue for eight straight quarters. Q2 2026 hit 12.8%, the lowest in the series. Per quarterly releases and SEC 10-Q/10-K filings.

The key question from the screening was whether the wart is shrinking. The answer is yes, on both measures. Annual SBC fell from \$84.3M in 2024 to \$78.7M in 2025, a 6.6% decline in absolute dollars, and from 20.8% to 17.2% of revenue. In the first half of 2026 it fell again to \$34.0M from \$40.0M a year earlier, or 13.9% of revenue versus 18.1%. The decline is broad: sales and marketing SBC, the biggest bucket, is down as the company restructures.

**Why this matters more than it looks.** Every point of SBC as a share of revenue is a point of margin that converts to real earnings if headcount discipline holds. The 2026 restructuring (20% workforce reduction, about 260 roles) is designed to lock this in: fewer shares granted, more of the remaining grants tied to the AI and enterprise bets. Dilution is slowing too: weighted-average shares rose 3.1% year over year in Q2 2026, and a \$50M buyback authorization now offsets part of it.

# AI: headwind or tailwind?

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This is the central strategic question for any third-party social tool. AI cuts both ways, so here is each side stated fairly.

**The tailwind case.** AI makes Sprout's data more valuable, not less. Two billion daily social interactions are raw material that gets more useful as the analysis gets smarter: Trellis turns that firehose into executive summaries and early warnings, which is work a native scheduling tool cannot do. The retention evidence (Trellis users renew at higher rates) suggests AI deepens the product's grip. And Trellis Plus converts AI usage into per-seat revenue, which is pricing power: the more value the AI creates, the more customers pay. Social intelligence moving from the marketing team to the C-suite expands the budget it can tap.

**The headwind case.** The platforms own the data and the audience. Meta's Business Suite, TikTok's tools, and X's native analytics keep getting better, and they are free. If a brand only needs to schedule posts and read basic analytics, the native tools plus a cheap scheduler are enough, which pressures the low end (Sprout's own Essentials plan at \$79/month exists precisely to defend it). Salesforce, the prized partner, is also building its own AI agents: Agentforce could one day answer the questions Trellis answers today. And Sprout's own filings name the risk explicitly: "technological advances in AI may in the future disrupt the social media industry, which could significantly reduce the demand for our services." API access is a stated risk factor too: if a platform restricts its API, features break.

**The net read.** AI raises the value of Sprout's proprietary layer (the cross-network data, the workflow, the integrations) while commoditizing the simple layer (scheduling, basic analytics). That favors the enterprise mix shift: large customers with complex needs pay for intelligence, small customers get squeezed toward free native tools. The moat is not wider than it was, but it is deeper where it counts. Watch Trellis Plus attach rates and enterprise net retention: if AI is a tailwind, both rise.

# Financials: approaching breakeven, already profitable on a cash basis

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|                           | FY2023     | FY2024          | FY2025          | H1 2026         |
|---------------------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Revenue                   | \$333.6M   | \$405.9M (+22%) | \$457.5M (+13%) | \$245.3M (+11%) |
| Gross margin              | 77.1%      | 77.5%           | 77.6%           | 77.3%           |
| GAAP operating margin     | -20.8%     | -14.9%          | -9.5%           | -3.5%           |
| Non-GAAP operating margin | unverified | unverified      | ~9%             | 12.3%           |
| GAAP net loss             | (\$66.4M)  | (\$62.0M)       | (\$43.3M)       | (\$9.4M)        |
| SBC as % of revenue       | 20.3%      | 20.8%           | 17.2%           | 13.9%           |
| Operating cash flow       | \$6.5M     | \$26.3M         | \$43.4M         | \$33.7M         |
| Free cash flow            | \$4.4M     | \$23.4M         | \$39.3M         | \$32.0M         |

Per SEC 10-K (FY2023-2025) and 10-Q filings. H1 2026 from the Q2 2026 release. Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus capex; company non-GAAP FCF adds back small items.


The shape of the story is operating leverage arriving slowly. Revenue has compounded while operating expenses barely grew: total opex was \$398.3M in 2025 versus \$374.8M in 2024, up only 6% on 13% revenue growth, and H1 2026 opex of \$198.1M is up less than 2% year over year. Sales and marketing, the largest line at 42% of revenue in 2025, is the restructuring target. RPO (remaining performance obligations, contracted revenue not yet recognized) was \$400.8M at June 30, up 16%, with \$282.7M current, up 12%: the backlog is growing faster than revenue.

**Guidance vs. actuals: a beat-and-raise pattern in 2026.** Q4 2025 beat on revenue (\$120.9M vs ~\$118.8M expected) and EPS (\$0.20 vs \$0.16). Q1 2026 beat (\$121.5M vs \$120.4M; EPS \$0.23 vs \$0.16) and lifted full-year revenue guidance to \$494M from \$492.7M. Q2 2026 beat again (\$123.8M vs \$122.2M; EPS \$0.26 vs \$0.16), lifted revenue guidance to \$494.3M, raised non-GAAP EPS guidance 22% to \$1.13, and raised the exit-Q4 non-GAAP operating margin target from 15% to about 17%. The 30% Rule-of-40 target (revenue growth plus non-GAAP operating margin) by Q4 2027 was reiterated.

# Balance sheet and cash flow: a fortress for its size

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## Cash flow is positive every quarter; the cash pile keeps growing



Operating and free cash flow have been positive for six straight quarters while quarter-end cash climbed to \$119.9M. Q3/Q4 2025 derived from annual and 9-month SEC filings.

At June 30, 2026: cash and equivalents of \$119.9M, up from \$95.3M at year-end 2025. Debt is a single \$100M revolving credit facility with \$32.5M drawn, down from \$40M at year-end. Net cash is therefore about \$87.4M, and \$67.5M of the facility remains undrawn. There is no term loan, no bond, no convertible hanging over the equity.

The restructuring sharpens the picture. In July 2026 the board approved cutting about 20% of the workforce (roughly 260 roles), expecting \$18-20M of pre-tax charges, mostly in Q3 2026, for at least \$50M of annualized cost savings. Management is explicit that the savings fund investment in Trellis and enterprise capabilities rather than just dropping to the bottom line. A \$50M share repurchase authorization was announced alongside, with management citing a disconnect between the market valuation and long-term potential.


**What "net cash" means.** Cash minus debt. A net-cash company can fund itself, buy back stock, and survive a bad year without raising money. For a \$570M company, \$87M of net cash plus \$68M of undrawn credit is genuine downside protection, and it is why the balance-sheet grade is high despite the small absolute scale.

# Valuation: what the price assumes

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At \$10.38, with a market cap near \$570M and \$87.4M of net cash, Sprout trades at about **1.2x trailing-twelve-month revenue** (\$481.8M) and about **1.0x on enterprise value** (market cap minus net cash). For a SaaS business with 78% gross margins, positive free cash flow, and double-digit growth, that is a modest multiple: profitable SaaS peers typically trade at 4-8x sales. The discount reflects slower growth, the SMB demand headwinds, and the unresolved AI question.

On earnings, the picture is split. GAAP earnings are still slightly negative, so a P/E is meaningless. On the company's own non-GAAP EPS guidance of \$1.13 for 2026, the stock trades at about 9x forward non-GAAP earnings, which is cheap if you believe the non-GAAP adjustments (mostly SBC) keep shrinking, and a value trap if they do not.



Illustrative FY2029 scenario price targets from the \$10.38 reference price. Scenarios, not forecasts. Formula: (FY2029 revenue x EV/Sales + net cash) / diluted shares.

|                            | BEAR             | BASE              | BULL              |
|----------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| FY2029 revenue             | \$545M (3% CAGR) | \$660M (10% CAGR) | \$745M (15% CAGR) |
| EV/Sales multiple          | 0.9x             | 2.0x              | 3.0x              |
| Enterprise value           | \$490M           | \$1,320M          | \$2,235M          |
| Plus: net cash             | \$40M            | \$120M            | \$160M            |
| Equity value               | \$530M           | \$1,440M          | \$2,395M          |
| Diluted shares             | 64M              | 62.5M             | 63M               |
| <b>FY2029 price target</b> | <b>\$8.25</b>    | <b>\$23.00</b>    | <b>\$38.00</b>    |
| Return from \$10.38        | -21%             | +122%             | +266%             |

**Base case.** Growth holds near 10% as the enterprise cohort compounds and Trellis Plus adds ARPU; the market pays 2x sales for a profitable, FCF-positive SaaS grower, still below peer multiples. **Bear case.** Growth stalls to 3%, AI disruption bites the SMB base, the multiple stays below 1x. **Bull case.** Trellis becomes a real up-sell engine, growth re-accelerates toward 15%, and the multiple re-rates to 3x sales. Analyst consensus sits at \$10.43 (MarketBeat, September 2026), essentially the current price; the street is waiting for proof.

# Risks, honestly stated

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| RISK                    | SEVERITY | DETAIL                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|-------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| AI disintermediation    | High     | Meta, TikTok, and X keep improving free native tools. Salesforce's own Agentforce could answer the questions Trellis answers. The company itself flags AI disruption as a risk that could "significantly reduce the demand for our services."               |
| SMB demand weakness     | Medium   | Management guides continued headwinds for customers under \$30k ARR. The Essentials plan (\$79/month) defends the low end, but small-customer churn is the drag on the growth rate.                                                                         |
| Securities class action | Medium   | Consolidated class action and derivative suits since May 2024 allege misleading statements about the enterprise strategy, the Salesforce partnership, and ARR disclosures. No liability accrued; the company says an unfavorable outcome could be material. |
| API dependence          | Medium   | The platform lives on third-party APIs. If a social network restricts access or changes terms, features break. This is a stated 10-K risk factor.                                                                                                           |
| Restructuring execution | Medium   | Cutting 20% of staff while asking the remaining team to sell harder to enterprises and ship AI features is operationally risky. The \$50M savings target must materialize without hurting growth.                                                           |
| Competition             | Medium   | Hootsuite (the share leader), Sprinklr (enterprise CXM), Brandwatch, and a long tail of cheaper tools. Sprout leads on ease of use and trust scores, not on scale.                                                                                          |
| SBC relapse             | Low      | The wart is shrinking, but equity comp could rebound if the stock falls and grants are repriced, or if hiring re-accelerates. Watch the SBC line every quarter.                                                                                             |
| Customer concentration  | Low      | No customer exceeds 10% of revenue. The risk is cohort concentration: 61% of subscription revenue from the \$30k+ group means enterprise demand matters more each year.                                                                                     |

**Kill criteria.** The thesis breaks if: SBC as a share of revenue turns back up for two straight quarters; the \$30k+ cohort's revenue contribution growth falls below 10% while SMB churn accelerates; Trellis Plus shows no ARPU lift after a full year; or the class action produces a material judgment. Any one forces a full re-underwrite.

# Leadership: a scaler, with the founder still in the room



**Ryan Barretto** became CEO on October 1, 2024. He joined Sprout in 2016 as SVP of Global Sales and Success, became President in December 2020, and helped scale the business from \$30M of ARR to more than \$385M exiting 2023. Before Sprout he spent ten years at Salesforce in leadership roles as the company scaled from \$180M to more than \$7B in annual sales. He is a go-to-market scaler, which matches the company's current chapter: the product is built, and the job is selling it upmarket.

**Justyn Howard**, the co-founder, moved to Executive Chair in the same transition and remains a greater-than-10% owner. His continued presence keeps founder-level product judgment in the room while Barretto runs the business. Insider sales since have been 10b5-1 tax-withholding sales on RSU vesting, not open-market liquidations.

**Did-what-they-said evidence.** The 2026 record is clean: Q1 and Q2 both beat revenue and EPS expectations, full-year guidance was raised twice, the exit-Q4 non-GAAP margin target was raised from 15% to 17%, Trellis shipped to all customers on the promised July timeline, and the restructuring was announced with specific numbers (\$18-20M charges, \$50M+ savings) rather than vague efficiency language. The prior CFO, Joe Del Preto, resigned effective March 2026; Barretto has served as interim principal financial officer since, which is a watch item until a permanent CFO is named.

The blemish is the class action: shareholders allege the company oversold its enterprise pivot, including the value of the Salesforce partnership, in 2024. Management denies wrongdoing. It has not affected operations, but it is a permanent asterisk on the disclosure record until resolved.

# Catalysts: what moves the needle

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| CATALYST                    | TIMING            | WHAT GOOD LOOKS LIKE                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Q3 2026 earnings            | Late October 2026 | Revenue \$123.3-124.1M guided; the tell is Trellis Plus attach and \$30k+ cohort growth holding near 20%.                                             |
| Restructuring savings proof | Q4 2026 - Q1 2027 | \$50M annualized savings showing up in opex while revenue growth holds: operating leverage, not just cuts.                                            |
| GAAP profitability          | 2027              | The quarterly GAAP loss was \$3.1M in Q2 2026. A first GAAP-profitable quarter removes the "unprofitable" label and the SBC debate changes character. |
| Trellis Plus monetization   | Ongoing           | Paid Plus seats converting from the 100-credit free tier; ARPU expansion in the enterprise cohort.                                                    |
| Share buyback execution     | Ongoing           | \$50M authorization used opportunistically; offsets dilution and signals management's view of value.                                                  |
| Salesforce expansion        | Ongoing           | More joint enterprise wins like the Q2 seven-figure manufacturing deal; deeper Agentforce co-existence rather than competition.                       |
| Rule of 40 progress         | Q4 2027 target    | Revenue growth plus non-GAAP operating margin reaching 30 (Q2 2026: 23.7). The company's own scoreboard.                                              |

**What would change the thesis.** Sustained re-acceleration toward mid-teens growth with Trellis ARPU evidence would upgrade the fundamental grade and the score. An SBC relapse, enterprise cohort deceleration below 10%, or a material class-action outcome would downgrade it.

# Verdict

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## B

Fundamental grade: 11% growth, 78% gross margins, near GAAP breakeven, beat-and-raise pattern. Growth is cooling and SMB is soft.

## A-

Balance sheet: \$119.9M cash, \$32.5M drawn on a \$100M facility, \$87.4M net cash. A fortress for a \$570M company. Minus for the lawsuit overhang.

## C+

Technical grade: above the 200-day average, below the 50-day, RSI 39. Basing after a deep drawdown; 27% below the 52-week high.

## B+

Valuation grade: 1.2x trailing sales, 1.0x EV/sales, ~9x forward non-GAAP EPS. Cheap if the SBC decline holds; fair if growth stays at 11%.

## The one-paragraph case

Sprout Social is a real SaaS business priced like a melting one. Trailing revenue of \$481.8M grows about 11%, gross margins hold near 78%, free cash flow is positive and rising (\$50.3M trailing), and the balance sheet carries \$87.4M of net cash against a \$570M market cap. The historic wart, stock-based compensation, is shrinking in both dollars and as a share of revenue, down to 12.8% in Q2 2026 from 20.8% in 2024. The enterprise mix shift is working: the \$30k+ cohort drives 61% of subscription revenue and grows 20%. Trellis AI is early but shows the two things that matter, better retention and a paid upsell tier. At \$10.38, about 1x sales, the market is paying nothing for any of this to improve. The base case to \$23.00 by FY2029 assumes growth merely holds near 10% and the multiple normalizes to 2x sales. The bear case to \$8.25 is stalled growth with AI headwinds winning. Selective positive: the numbers are better than the price, but the AI moat question keeps it selective rather than a high-conviction call.

**Action.** Track the SBC line, the \$30k+ cohort growth rate, and Trellis Plus attach each quarter. Enter only with the AI-disintermediation risk sized appropriately: this is a show-me story on the moat, not on the financials. This is research, not investment advice.

# Sources and methodology

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**Method.** This report uses only information available through October 1, 2026. Financial figures come from Sprout Social press releases and SEC filings (10-K filed February 27, 2026; 10-Qs filed May 8 and August 7, 2026). Market data comes from Finnhub (October 1, 2026 session) with technical indicators computed from Finnhub daily candles through September 28, 2026. Scenario targets are illustrative models, not forecasts: scenario revenue times a scenario EV/Sales multiple, plus scenario net cash, divided by scenario shares. Derived quarterly figures (e.g., Q3/Q4 2025 cash flow splits) are computed from annual and interim filings and labeled as derived.

| CLAIM                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | SOURCE                                                                                                             |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Q2 2026: \$123.8M revenue (+11%), GAAP op loss (\$2.7M), non-GAAP op income \$16.0M, GAAP net loss (\$3.1M), non-GAAP net income \$15.6M / \$0.26, cash \$119.9M, OCF \$8.5M, non-GAAP FCF \$8.3M, RPO \$400.8M (+16%), cRPO \$282.7M (+12%) | Sprout Social Q2 2026 release, August 6, 2026 (GlobeNewswire)                                                      |
| Q3/FY2026 guidance: rev \$123.3-124.1M / \$493.0-495.6M; non-GAAP op income \$17.5-18.3M / \$68.3-70.3M; non-GAAP EPS \$0.29-0.30 / \$1.11-1.15; exit Q4 non-GAAP margin ~17%; Rule of 40 target 30 by Q4 2027                               | Sprout Social Q2 2026 release, August 6, 2026                                                                      |
| FY2025/2024/2023: revenue \$457.5M / \$405.9M / \$333.6M; SBC \$78.7M / \$84.3M / \$67.7M; net loss (\$43.3M) / (\$62.0M) / (\$66.4M); OCF \$43.4M / \$26.3M / \$6.5M; \$30k+ customers 3,803 / 3,374; \$50k+ 2,022 / 1,718                  | Sprout Social 10-K for FY2025, filed February 27, 2026                                                             |
| Q1 2026: \$121.5M revenue (+11.2%), non-GAAP op income \$14.1M, EPS \$0.23; cash \$111.6M; revolver \$32.5M                                                                                                                                  | Sprout Social Q1 2026 10-Q, filed May 8, 2026; StockStory coverage                                                 |
| Q3 2025: \$115.6M revenue, (\$9.4M) net loss, SBC \$19.0M; 9M 2025 OCF \$32.5M, SBC \$59.0M                                                                                                                                                  | Sprout Social Q3 2025 10-Q (via StockTitan)                                                                        |
| Q4 2025: \$120.9M revenue (+12.9%), net loss (\$10.7M), non-GAAP EPS \$0.20; RPO \$404.0M (+15%)                                                                                                                                             | Sprout Social Q4 2025 release (via StockTitan); StockStory                                                         |
| Workforce reduction: ~20% (~260 roles), \$18-20M pre-tax charges mostly Q3 2026, >=\$50M annualized savings; \$50M buyback; Trellis Plus launch July; Trellis retention evidence                                                             | Sprout Social Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (via Mitrade, Aug 2026); Q2 10-Q subsequent events (via StockTitan) |
| Trellis GA July 2026 to all plans; Trellis Studio; 100 credits/user/month included; Trellis Plus \$35/user/mo monthly, \$28 annual (1,000 credits); JetBlue, Ipsy cases                                                                      | Sprout Social Trellis GA release, August 19, 2026 (GlobeNewswire); Trellis pricing documentation (via quasa.io)    |
| Salesforce global partnership (2022); expanded Aug 7, 2025: first BYO-Channel Digital Engagement connection (Instagram, LinkedIn, X, Messenger, WhatsApp); Service Cloud, Sales Cloud, Tableau, Slack, Agentforce integrations               | Sprout Social releases, March 2022 and August 7, 2025; sproutsocial.com partnership page                           |
| Barretto CEO Oct 1, 2024; joined 2016, scaled \$30M ARR to \$385M+ exiting 2023; 10 years at Salesforce (\$180M to \$7B); Howard co-founder to Executive Chair                                                                               | Sprout Social CEO succession release, April 15, 2024                                                               |
| Securities class action + derivative suits since May 2024 (Munch v. Sprout Social); allegations on enterprise strategy, Salesforce partnership, ARR; no liability accrued                                                                    | Sprout Social 10-K FY2025, Notes/Legal Proceedings; Q2 2026 10-Q (via StockTitan)                                  |
| CFO Joe Del Preto resignation effective March 11, 2026; Barretto interim principal financial officer                                                                                                                                         | Sprout Social 2026 proxy statement (via StockTitan); Q1 2026 10-Q certifications                                   |
| Reference price \$10.38 (+6.2%), 52-week \$4.92-\$14.29, mkt cap ~\$564M; 6-mo +82.1%, 1-yr -16.8%                                                                                                                                           | Finnhub market data, October 1, 2026 session                                                                       |